Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s six-day tour of Indonesia, Australia and New Zealand came amid uncertainty over US President Donald Trump’s commitment to a balanced Asian order, his talk of a possible US-China “G-2”, and the Pentagon’s decision to drop the Indo-Pacific label. It underlines Delhi’s intent to strengthen its independent role in Asia and its Indo-Pacific waters. It also marks a new phase in India’s post-Cold War engagement with the East. The celebrated “Look East” and “Act East” policies broadened India’s ties with Southeast and East Asia over the last three decades. Yet India has fallen well short of realising the full potential of these relationships. Consider ASEAN. India’s trade with the grouping rose from about $7 billion in 2000 to around $125 billion in 2025. During the same period, China’s trade with ASEAN expanded from roughly $40 billion to nearly $1 trillion. The gap is equally visible in connectivity, technology partnerships and defence cooperation.

The three-nation tour was an effort to narrow that gap by combining economic, strategic and security cooperation. In Indonesia, the decision to accelerate development of Sabang port could strengthen logistics, maritime domain awareness and naval cooperation. Expanded defence cooperation, including the sale of BrahMos missiles, highlights India’s growing potential as a defence exporter in Southeast Asia. In Australia, the decision to begin talks on a comprehensive FTA builds on recent trade liberalisation, while the completion of administrative arrangements for Australian uranium exports supports India’s ambitious plans for expanding nuclear power generation. Beyond uranium, Australia’s vast reserves of critical minerals and energy resources can become an important foundation for India’s long-term industrial growth. Enhanced maritime cooperation in the eastern Indian Ocean is an equally important strategic gain. Modi’s visit to New Zealand ends a prolonged period of diplomatic neglect. The recently concluded FTA and expanded maritime cooperation provide a platform for greater engagement with the South Pacific, where China’s growing strategic presence is attracting attention.

Taken together, the three visits point to a broader Indo-Pacific strategy that links maritime security, defence production, trade, technology and resilient supply chains. Yet, India’s principal constraint has not been the lack of diplomatic initiatives. It lies in the failure to implement them. The discussions on Sabang port and Australian uranium began nearly a decade ago. There is too much celebration of the PM’s foreign tours and too little attention to what happens afterwards. The significance of his Pacific tour will depend less on the intent behind the agreements than on the actions on the domestic front that facilitate their implementation.